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ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

REGENTS GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT AND EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE
PREFACE
L. Ray Patterson*
The Regents Guide to Copyright and Educational Fair Use,
adopted by the Regents of the University System of Georgia, is the
most comprehensive statement on copyright and educational fair
use ever adopted by a major university system. The purpose of this
comment is to provide a brief background for readers and users of
the document.'
The Regents Copyright Committee, appointed by Dr. James
Muyskens, Senior Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, University
System of Georgia, continues in existence and has eight members,
who represent a cross-section of the university community, and
include administrators (two of whom are lawyers), faculty (two of
whom are lawyers), and librarians. The Chair is Dr. William Gray
Potter, University Librarian at the University of Georgia. All
members of the Committee have had first hand experience with
problems applying the educational fair use doctrine.
In preparing the Guide, the Committee operated as a committee
of the whole and all members share the responsibility and deserve
the credit-or blame, as the case may be-for the final product. All
positions in the Guide were discussed, debated, and approved by
the members, in all cases by a majority, and in most instances by

* Pope Brock Professor of Law, University of Georgia.

'The author is a member of the Regents Copyright Committee, but the views expressed
in this Comment are his, not those of the Committee.
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consensus. All members of the committee participated, in varying
degrees, in the drafting (and redrafting) process.
A study of copyright law made apparent major differences about
the proper interpretation of the fair use section of the copyright
statute, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Copyright notices, for example,
commonly provide that no one may copy any portion of the book
without the written consent of the publisher. Section 107, however,
says that "the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies . .. is not an infringement of copyright."'
More important, for purposes of educational fair use, the section
lists use for "teaching (includingmultiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research" as exemplars of fair use.' Given this
disparity between the provisions of the statute and the language of
many copyright notices, the Committee had no choice but to reason
its way through the logic of educational fair use in light of the
copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution, the copyright statute, and
U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
Although there is little identification of educational fair use as
such in the cases or literature, Congress gave an unusual amount
of attention to it. Thus, four provisions of the Copyright Act are
directed to educational fair use:
-

teaching, research, and scholarship as exemplars of
fair use, § 107;
a non-profit educational purpose as one of the fair
use factors, § 107(1);
the subordination of the limitations on library
photocopying to the right of fair use § 108(f)(4); and
the limitation of the liability of employees of nonprofit educational institutions and their employees
for good faith use, even though the use turns out to
be infringing, § 504.

These statutory provisions indicate the importance Congress
attached to educational fair use, and this manifestation of congressional concern was a factor in the consideration of the "Agreement

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
3 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added).
2
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on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational
Institutions."
Contained in the House Report on the 1976
Copyright Act, pages 68-70, the Agreement on Guidelines has been
widely cited by publishers as having the effect of replacing the right
of educational fair use under section 107. This view of the
Agreement, however, is inconsistent with Congress' special
treatment of educational use as well as the language in the
introduction to the Agreement. That language clearly says that
"the following statement of guidelines is not intended to limit the
types of copying permitted under the standards of fair use under
judicial decision and which are stated in Section 107.""
In addition to this language, there is the fact that Congress did
not enact the Agreement on Classroom Guidelines, and whatever
its legal status, it seems clear that an agreement between private
parties cannot override the copyright statute that Congress did
enact. The Agreement on Classroom Guidelines, then, did not
prove to be very useful in seeking to provide a balanced guide to
educational fair use for members of the educational community.
There are two fair use cases often cited as limiting the right of
educational fair use.' These cases, however, do not support this
proposition. Upon analyzing them, a reader will find that the
courts rendering them did not rule on educational fair use at all.
The defendants in the cases were not professors or students, but
commercial copyshops, and the holdings were that a commercial
copyshop in making the copies-even at the request of a professor-makes a commercial use of the works copied and is not
entitled to the fair use defense.7 By limiting their holding to
commercial use, the courts avoided the issue of educational fair use,
that is, whether a professor or student could make copies of
excerpts for teaching and learning.
A basic issue facing anyone concerned with the advancement of
knowledge is whether the right of educational fair use is congruent
with the constitutional policies of copyright and consistent with
'H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976).
'H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68.

'Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.

1996).
7 Basic Books, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1639-40; Princeton University Press, 99 F.3d at 1389.
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decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The copyright clause of the
U.S. Constitution is a limitation on, as well as a grant of, Congressional power and manifests the limitation in three policies: 1) the
promotion of learning, because it so states;8 2) the protection of the
public domain, because copyright is available only for original
works only for a limited time; and 3) public access to copyrighted
materials, because the constitutional purpose of copyright is to
promote learning. And since educational fair use is in the public
interest, the Regent's Guide is consistent with the rulings of the
U.S. Supreme Court that copyright is primarily to benefit the
public and only secondarily to benefit the author (or copyright
owner).
My own view is that the Committee followed reason to its logical
conclusion and provided a balanced view of educational fair use
that will serve the cause of learning without disserving copyright
owners. My observation of the Committee's deliberations convinced
me that the members remained fully cognizant throughout its
deliberations of the legitimacy of the economic concern of publishers, but also of the constitutional and statutory limitations on the
copyright monopoly and of its responsibility to provide a guide for
members of the University System community that is within the
law. My impression was that the Committee members were
concerned with what the law is, not what they might wish it to be.
Above all, they seemed to want to avoid the fallacy that occurs
when the wish becomes father to the thought.
Any disinterested reader who studies the Guide and examines
the authorities relied upon will, I think, agree that teachers and
students may safely rely upon it as a guide to the fair use of
copyrighted materials for the classroom.

8 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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FOREWORD
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the
Progressof Science... by securingfor limited Times to
Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings...
- U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, CL. 8
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors,but '[t]opromote the Progressof Science
and useful Arts.' . .. To this end, copyright assures
authorsthe right to theiroriginalexpression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work ....
This result is neither
unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which
copyright advances the progress of science and art.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Feist Publications,Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-350 (1991)
The most famous newspaper headline in American history may
well be the Chicago Tribune's famous gaffe about the outcome of
the 1948 presidential election: "Dewey defeats Truman." (CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 3, 1948) Some fifty years later, a staff member of the
Truman Presidential Library in Missouri, while preparing a video
on President Truman for library visitors, asked the newspaper for
permission to use the headline in the video. The newspaper
refused, presumably on the grounds that the law of copyright gave
it the power to say who could use the headline and who could not.
The Chicago Tribune was wrong. Copyright requires an original
work of authorship and a three-word headline does not qualify.
The incident reveals the two most common errors committed in
the name of copyright: a request for permission to use material
when no request is needed and a denial of such requests. These
errors suggest that there is a vast amount of confusion about
copyright and the right to use copyrighted material. Since
copyright is the grant of a limited monopoly in recorded knowledge,
this confusion has large consequences for society. Indeed, there is
currently an important public policy debate about copyright and
fair use.
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That debate, however, is about what copyright law should be, not
what it currently is. The Regents Copyright Committee has
concerned itself with what the law is, not what it should be. The
Guide will thus contribute to the policy debate only insofar as it
increases an understanding of copyright law and fair use.
The purpose of this Guide is to provide faculty, employees, and
students of the University System of Georgia with a basic understanding of copyright and fair use. Individuals and institutions
acquire copyrighted materials-books, journals, videotapes, sound
recordings, etc.-and expect to use them to support educational and
research activities. This is especially important today when
advanced information technology offers so many ways to enhance
instruction. New technology complicates the issue. A teacher may
have been quite comfortable providing photocopies of a magazine
article to students in one classroom, but may begin to be concerned
if the students are spread across many classrooms in diverse
geographic locations connected by distance learning technology.
It would be impossible to prepare a guide that exhaustively lists
all possible uses of copyrighted materials and gives guidance for
each situation. Instead, this Guide attempts to provide a basic
framework for applying copyright law and fair use. Each situation
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. This Guide should
enable members of the University System Community to make
these evaluations.
The Constitution of the United States and the existing copyright
law recognize that a balance is needed between the rights of the
copyright holder and society's need to use copyrighted works to
advance learning. It is valuable to our society for authors and
publishers to have a market for their work, but the open exchange
of ideas is also crucial to education and to an informed citizenry.
The basic thrust of the present document is that the rights
assigned to copyright holders under existing law are essentially
marketing rights. That is, the copyright owners have the right to
sell their works, and users should not interfere with that right by
diminishing the available market for a work or by selling pirated
copies. However, the existing copyright law expressly provides for
the "fair use" of copyrighted materials, especially for education and
research. The basic rule of thumb, elaborated in the document, is
that a copyrighted work can be used or copied for educational
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purposes so long as the use is not solely a substitute for purchasing
a copy of the work.
Most users of this Guide will and should focus on the first two
sections-the principles for applying fair use and the illustrative
examples that follow. Reading these two sections should enable
readers to analyze most situations and determine if their use of a
publication is fair or if it infringes on the rights of the copyright
owner. The last two sections explain the positions taken in this
Guide and provide the supporting legal authorities for these
positions.
While the present federal copyright law was passed in 1976
before the advent of so much of the technology that now pervades
higher education, present copyright law can be applied in virtually
all situations. The underlying doctrine that allows use of copyrighted materials for educational purposes still pertains whether a
publication is print or electronic or multimedia.
This document is a good faith effort to explain copyright and fair
use to our community.
How should members of the University System of Georgia
Community determine the fair use of copyrighted materials for
teaching, scholarship, and research? The answer is found in three
different bodies of law: (1) the copyright clause of the U.S.
Constitution; (2) the current copyright statute; and (3) copyright
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Because copyright is the statutory grant of monopoly rights in
recorded knowledge to serve a public purpose-the promotion of
learning--copyright law consists of an interrelated set of complex
rules. On one hand, copyright gives proprietary rights to copyright
holders; on the other, it grants learning rights to users in the form
of the fair use doctrine. Since the law provides rights for both
holders of copyright and for users of copyrighted works, and since
everyone has a duty to respect the law, it follows that users have
a duty to respect the rights of holders and holders have a duty to
respect the rights of users. The problem is to know the limits of
the respective rights, and that is the problem to which this
document is directed.
Special care has been taken to ensure that the contents of this
Guide accurately reflect the law. To this end, the Committee has
relied upon the copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution, the
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copyright statute, and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. A
complex body of law, of course, provides room for reasonable
persons to disagree as to meaning and interpretation, and there
will probably be those who disagree with some of the positions this
document reflects. Nevertheless, the Committee is convinced that
the positions taken in the Guide are both sound and supported by
legal authority and that members of the University System
Community may safely rely on them.
A caveat to members of the University Community is appropriate. This Guide is limited to copyright and fair use and does not
deal with other intellectual property issues, for example, patents.
For guidance on those issues, reference should be made to the
Regents Intellectual Property Policy.
PART I. PRINCIPLES OF FAIR USE
The 1976 Copyright Act grants the "fair use" of copyrighted
materials for a variety of purposes, for the creation of new works,
for educational use, and for personal use. The following principles
provide a framework for the application of educational fair use.
The goal is to enable teachers and scholars to use copyrighted
materials for teaching, scholarship, and research with respect for
the rights of copyright holders as well as their own rights.
The principles are based on three propositions: (1) the copyright
statute regulates the copyright monopoly it grants in order to
maintain an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright
holders and the rights of users; (2) the copyright monopoly is
essentially for marketing a work and does not extend to the copy
of a work that the copyright owner has sold; and (3) the ultimate
test for educational fair use is whether the copying is done for.
sound pedagogical reasons and not simply to avoid purchasing a
work.
These ideas, and the fair use principles stated below, are
grounded in the discussion that follows in Part III and in the legal
authorities discussed in Part IV. The principles of fair use are
derived from the Fair Use Statute, 17 U.S.C. § 107, which is
printed in full in Part IV.
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Fair use is derivative of copyright and is complex in part
because there are three kinds of copyright, each of which
varies in the scope of copyright protection:
a. Creative copyright, for original works such as a novel,
drama, painting, sonata, or poem (plenary copyright
protection)
b. Compilation copyright, for a directory or anthology
(limited copyright protection)
c.
Derivative copyright, for works based on another work,
such as a motion picture based on a novel (limited
copyright protection)
Fair use applies to all copyrighted works regardless of the
media in which they are fixed: print, electronic, or multimedia.
There are four kinds of use:
a. Personal use is the use of a copyrighted work for the
purpose for which it was intended, e.g., reading a book.
b. Infringing use is a use that violates one of the rights
granted to copyright holders in section 106 of the copyright statute.
c.
Fair use is a use permitted by the copyright statute that
might otherwise be infringing.
d. Constitutional use is the use of uncopyrightable, i.e.,
public domain, material and is protected by the U.S.
Constitution.
Fair use is a right granted to users by section 107 of the
copyright statute.
Fair use modifies the marketing monopoly of the copyright
holder so that copyright can fulfill its constitutional purpose
of promoting learning.
Everyone has a constitutional right to use public domain
material without limitation, even if it is included in a
copyrighted work.
One infringes a copyright, not a work, and fair use applies
only to the use of the copyright. Therefore, determining if a
use is fair requires making the following distinctions between
a use of the work itself and a use of the copyright of the work:
a. One who copies a work to put it on the market uses the
copyright, because the copyright holder has the right to
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market the work. Without permission, such a use is an
infringing use.
b. One who copies from a work for study or research uses
the work, not the copyright, because the use is a use for
which the work was intended. Such a use is a fair use,
not an infringement.
8.
One may always use a work without permission; one may use
a copyright only with permission or as a matter of fair use.
9.
The threshold issue in determining fair use is whether the
copying involves a use of the work or a use of the copyright
because:
a. The use of the work is by definition a protected use.
b. The use of the copyright must be with permission or
must fulfill fair use criteria.
10. Fair use normally entails copying and is of three kinds:
a. Creative fair use by authors who copy from other works
to create their own work.
b. Personal fair use by individuals who copy from works for
their own learning or entertainment.
c. Educational fair use by teachers, scholars, and students
who copy for teaching, scholarship, or learning.
11. There are four nonexclusive statutory factors-all directed to
the marketing of works-to use in determining whether a use
is fair. They are:
a. The purpose of the use, including whether such use is for
commercial or for non-profit educational purposes.
(Commercial purpose implies a use of the copyright;
educational purpose, a use of the work.)
b. The nature of the work. (This requires a determination
of whether the work is a creative work, a compilation, or
a derivative work.)
c. The amount used in relation to the work as a whole.
(The amount of the work used is a major factor in
determining whether the use is merely a use of the work
or a use of the copyright; the greater the amount used,
the more likely the use will be a use of the copyright.)
d. The effect of the use on the market or potential market
for the work. (The greater the market effect, the less the
likelihood that the use will be fair.)
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The four factors are not exclusive. Other factors that may be
relevant are the availability of the work, the ability to
determine whether the work is still under copyright, and the
ability to locate the copyright holder.
The four factors are necessary because fair use is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis in order to protect the
constitutional rights of users.
Attempts to limit the fair use right with quantitative guidelines are without statutory authority.
The legal effect of quantitative guidelines is to provide a
safe-harbor, i.e., copying within the guideline limits automatically qualifies as fair use. Such guidelines do not, and cannot
legally, mean that copying in excess of the guidelines is
infringement and not fair use.
The limitations on the copyright monopoly in sections 108-120
grant rights to non-copyright holders as to particular type
uses; these rights, however, do not negate the general right of
fair use, which permits uses in excess of the limitations if the
additional uses are fair.
The location of the line between fair use and infringing use is
determined by the market factor, that is, the extent to which
the copy becomes a substitute for the purchase of the work.
The 1976 Copyright Act protects educational fair use with
four different provisions:
a. The use of works for "teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship and research" as exemplars of fair use (Sec. 107).
b. The distinction between commercial and nonprofit
educational use (Sec. 107(1)), a superfluous distinction
unless it means special protection for educational use.
c.
The provision that fair use overrides the limitations on
library photocopying (Sec. 108(f)(4)).
d. The good faith defense for employees of nonprofit educational institutions, libraries, and archives (Sec. 504(cX2)).
The copyright statute does not empower copyright holders to
override the fair use right by overbroad copyright notices or
other unilaterally imposed provisions.
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EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATING THE APPLICATION OF FAIR USE

The following examples are intended to aid members of the
University System Community to evaluate fair use at three levels:
creative, educational, and personal. They deal with situations
involving print, multimedia, distance learning, and electronic
reserves. The examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. These
examples apply to non-profit educational uses only.
A. RESEARCH AND WRITING

1. Comment and Criticism
SCENARIO A: A professor of English is writing a book comparing the work of three women poets, all of whose poems are
copyrighted.
QUESTION: May the professor quote the poems in her book?
ANSWER: Yes. This is one of the traditional types of fair use,
that is, creative fair use. Two other examples of fair use are use
for comment and criticism.
2. Unpublished Letters
SCENARIO B: A professor of psychology desires to edit and
publish a collection of unpublished letters in the library archives.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: The answer to this scenario requires further information. Has the copyright protection expired? Are the letters subject
to any agreement the library made with the donor? Can the author
or authors of the letters be located? Is the library agreeable to
publication? This is the type of problem that requires a detailed
legal and factual analysis. One should consult the institution's
office of legal affairs for advice.
3. JournalArticle for PersonalUse
SCENARIO C: A professor wishes to make a copy of an article
from a copyrighted periodical for her files to use later.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. This is a classic example of personal fair use so
long as the professor uses the article for her personal files and
reference. See SCENARIO E.
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4. Out-of-Print Book
SCENARIO D: A library has a book that is out of print and
unavailable. The book is an important one in the professor's field
that she needs for her research.
QUESTION a: May the professor copy the book for her files?
ANSWER: Yes. This is another example of personal use. If one
engages in the fair use analysis, one finds that: (1) the purpose of
the use is educational versus commercial; (2) the professor is using
the book, a creative work, for research purposes; (3) copying the
entire book would normally exceed the bounds of fair use, however,
since the book is out of print and no longer available from any
other source, the copying is acceptable; (4) finally, the copying will
have no impact on the market for the book because the book is no
longer available from any other source.
QUESTION b: Using the same facts as explained in SCENARIO
D, could the professor copy the book and place the book on reserve
in the library? Could the professor scan the book into her computer
and place the book onto the World Wide Web?
ANSWER: If the professor placed the book on reserve in the
library, the use would be considered a fair use. However, if the
professor placed the book on the Web, then the use is not a fair use.
Placement on the Web allows unlimited access to the book. This
would affect the copyright holder's public distribution of the book.
See SCENARIO R, SCENARIO T, and SCENARIO U.
B.

PRINTED MATERIAL

1. JournalArticle for Classroom Use
SCENARIO E: A professor copies one article from a periodical
for distribution to the class.
QUESTION: Is this fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. Distribution of multiple copies for classroom use
is a fair use.
2. Posting CopyrightedArticle to Web Page
SCENARIO F: A professor has posted his class notes on a Web
page available to the public. He wants to scan an article from a
copyrighted journal and add it to his Web page.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: It depends. If access to his Web page is restricted,
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then this is a fair use. If access is not limited, then this use is
probably not a fair use. No exclusively educational purpose can be
guaranteed by putting the article on the Web, and such conduct
would arguably violate the copyright holder's right of public
distribution.
3. Coursepacks
SCENARIO G: A professor copies excerpts of documents,
including copyrighted text books and journals, from various sources.
The professor plans to distribute the materials to his class as a
coursepack.
QUESTION a: Is the preparation of a coursepack for students in
the class a fair use?
ANSWER: One must do the fair use analysis. If the use of each
excerpt complies with the fair use criteria, then use of the coursepack is a fair use. The inclusion of the excerpts in a coursepack
will not change a fair use to an infringing use.
QUESTION b: Same facts as SCENARIO G, except the professor
prepares a digital or electronic coursepack. Is the preparation of an
electronic coursepack for students in the class a fair use?
ANSWER: If the professor anticipates distributing the coursepack via the World Wide Web, e-mail or compact disk, then a fair
use analysis is required.
4. Textbooks
SCENARIO H: A professor wishes to use a textbook he considers
to be too expensive. He makes copies of the book for the class.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: No. Although the use is educational, the professor is
using the entire work, and by providing copies of the entire book to
his students, he has affected the market. This conduct clearly
interferes with the marketing monopoly of the copyright owner.
The professor should place a copy on reserve or require the
students to purchase the book. See'following examples.
5. Textbooks for LibraryReserves
QUESTION: If in SCENARIO H the professor decides to make
three copies of the book and place them on reserve in the library for
the class, is this a fair use?
ANSWER: No. This conduct still interferes with the marketing
monopoly of the copyright owner. The professor may place a copy
of the textbook, not the copies, on reserve.
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6. Public Domain Materials
SCENARIO I: A teacher copies a Shakespearian play from a
copyrighted anthology.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: The play is in the public domain and not subject to
copyright protection and, therefore, one need not do a fair use
analysis. Other public domain materials include U.S. government
documents, works whose copyright has expired and unsealed court
records. There are other public domain materials; for a determination consult legal affairs.
C. VIDEO AND SOUND RECORDINGS

1. Showing a Videotape for Classroom Instruction
SCENARIO J: A teacher wishes to show a copyrighted motion
picture to her class for instructional purposes.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. It is fair use since it is for classroom instruction
and no admission fee is charged. Tuition and course fees do not
constitute admission fees.
2. Copying a Videotape for Classroom Instruction
SCENARIO K: A teacher makes a copy of the videotape
described in SCENARIO J for a colleague to show in her class at
the same time.
QUESTION: May she do so?
ANSWER: No. This is not a fair use. The teacher may lend her
personal copy of the videotape to a colleague for this purpose.
3. Renting a Videotape that is in the Public Domain for Nonclassroom Use
SCENARIO L: A professor wishes to raise funds for a scholarship. She rents a videocassette of a motion picture on which the
copyright has expired and charges admission fees.
QUESTION: May she do so?
ANSWER: Yes. The copyright of the motion picture has expired,
which places the motion picture in the public domain.
4. Renting a Videotape that is Copyright-Protectedfor Nonclassroom Use
SCENARIO M: The facts are the same as those in SCENARIO
L except that the movie is protected by copyright.
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QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: No. This is not a fair use because it infringes the
copyright owner's right to market the work.
D. MULTIMEDIA PROJECTS

1. ClassroomPresentation
SCENARIO N: A teacher or student prepares and gives a
presentation that displays photographs. Permission was not
obtained to use the photographs.
QUESTION: Can the photographs be included in the initial
presentation, if it is in a traditional classroom?
ANSWER: Yes. The copyright fair use provision explicitly
provides for classroom use of copyrighted material. Instructors and
students may perform and display their own educational projects
or presentations for instruction.
2. Electronic Transmissionor Broadcastof Classroom Presentation
QUESTION:
What if the presentation incorporating the
photographs discussed in SCENARIO N is broadcast to a distant
classroom?
ANSWER: Yes. This use would be considered fair use, as long
as the presentation is broadcast for remote instruction.
3. Broadcast of Classroom Presentationto Home or Office
QUESTION: What if the presentation discussed in SCENARIO
N is broadcast to students at their homes or offices? Would such
use be a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. This use would be considered fair use if the
individuals are enrolled in a course and viewing the presentation
for purposes of criticism, comment, teaching or instruction,
scholarship, or research.
4. Videotaping of Classroom Presentation
QUESTION: What if the teacher's or student's presentation
explained in SCENARIO N is videotaped? Would such use be a fair
use?
ANSWER: Yes. This use would be considered fair use, if the
videotape is used for educational purposes such as student review
or if the videotape is for instruction.
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5. Broadcast of Videotaped Classroom Presentation
QUESTION: What if the SCENARIO N presentation incorporating the photographs is videotaped and rebroadcast? Is this a fair
use?
ANSWER: Yes. The use of the photographs is fair use as long
as the presentation is videotaped and rebroadcast only for instruction.
6. Incorporationof Photographsin an Electronic Presentation
(Excludingthe Internet)
QUESTION: What if the SCENARIO N presentation is included
in an electronic presentation such as Microsoft's Power Point?
ANSWER: Yes. This should be considered fair use as long as
the electronic presentation is for educational or instructional use.
7. Making Changes to Photographs
QUESTION: What if the student or teacher were to change the
attributes of the pictures discussed in SCENARIO N?
ANSWER: Yes. This would be considered fair use for education,
comment, criticism, or parody. One must inform the audience that
changes were made to the photographer's copyrighted work.
8. Use of Copyrighted Music
SCENARIO 0: A teacher or student creates a presentation and
incorporates copyrighted music into the background. Assume that
permission was not obtained to use the music for the presentation.
QUESTION: Can the music be included in the teacher's or
student's initial presentation?
ANSWER: Yes. This is fair use if instruction is occurring.
9. Use of Music Over Two-Way Interactive Video (GSAMS)
SCENARIO P: Same facts as SCENARIO 0. The presentation
is broadcast to a distant classroom using two-way interactive video
(GSAMS).
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. The use of interactive video for educational
instruction is considered a fair use.
10. Use of Music in Videotaped Classroom Presentation
QUESTION: What if the teacher's or student's presentation
described in SCENARIO 0 is videotaped? Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. This is fair use if instruction is occurring.
11. Use of Music in Broadcastof Videotaped ClassroomPresentation
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QUESTION: What if the SCENARIO 0 presentation is videotaped and rebroadcast? Would this be a fair use?
ANSWER: The answer is not clear. If instruction is occurring
and there are no admission charges to the rebroadcast, the
presumption is that it may be fair use. Tuition and course fees do
not constitute admission fees.
12. Use of Music in an Electronic Presentation (Excluding the
Internet)
QUESTION: What if the SCENARIO 0 presentation is included
in an electronic presentation (excluding the Internet)? Would this
use be an appropriate fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. This is fair use if instruction is occurring.
13. Use of Music as Content in a Classroom Presentation
SCENARIO Q: A professor teaches an opera course, and the
professor creates a presentation. The presentation contains the
works of ten contemporary artists and is presented to a new class
every semester.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes, as long as the use of the presentation continues
to be for instruction.
14. Use of Music in Classroom Presentationson the Internet
QUESTION: The opera classroom presentation (SCENARIO Q)
or the presentation containing background music (SCENARIO 0)
is placed on the Internet. Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: This would be fair use so long as access is restricted,
e.g., by use of a password or PIN or other means.
E. DISTANCE EDUCATION

1. Videotape of Telecourse
SCENARIO R: Institution A creates a telecourse. The course
contains copyrighted text, video, audio, and photographs relevant
to the class.
QUESTION: If Institution A did not obtain permission to use the
copyrighted materials, can Institution A show the videotape of the
telecourse to students who have signed up for a telecourse at
Institution A?
ANSWER: Yes. Most experts believe that showing the videotape
to students enrolled in the telecourse is a fair use.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

23

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6

266

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 5:243

2. Videotape of Telecourse Shown at Other Institutions
QUESTION: Assume same facts as in SCENARIO R. If
Institution A did not obtain permission to use the copyrighted
materials, can students at Institution B enroll and receive credit for
the course at Institution B?
ANSWER: Yes. Most experts believe that showing the videotape
to students enrolled in the telecourse is a fair use.
3. Telecourse via the Internet
QUESTION: Assume same facts as in SCENARIO R. What if
the telecourse is transmitted via the Internet?
ANSWER: If the telecourse is broadcast and there is open
access, the audience is no longer clearly defined. A rebroadcast
over the Internet to a global audience is probably not a fair use. A
restricted broadcast of the telecourse is a fair use.
4. Telecourse via Cable Television
QUESTION: Assume same facts as in SCENARIO R. What if
the delivery mode is cable television?
ANSWER: The audience is no longer clearly defined, but if the
institution is broadcasting the material over an institutionally
controlled cable channel, then the use is fair.
5. Remote Access of Searchable Databasevia the Internet
SCENARIO S: A faculty member at Institution C creates a
searchable database of copyrighted materials. The database is used
as a part of a distance learning course and is available on the
institution's webserver. Students enrolled in the course access the
course materials from home, work, and other areas that are not
traditional classrooms. Access to the database is controlled and
available only to students enrolled in the class. The faculty
member did not obtain permission to use the copyrighted materials.
QUESTION a: Will this use of copyrighted materials from home,
work, or other areas constitute fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. So long as the materials are being accessed for
educational instruction and access remains controlled.
QUESTION b: What if the copyrighted materials in SCENARIO
S are musical works or dramatic works? Is the use a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. This is a fair use as long as the materials are
being accessed for educational instruction and access remains
controlled.
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6. Student Project for Distributionon the Internet
SCENARIO T: A student is taking a distance learning class in
which the instructor has required that a particular assignment be
created for unlimited distribution on the Web.
QUESTION: If a student includes an audio segment of copyrighted music (video, news broadcast, non-dramatic literary work),
is this a fair use?
ANSWER: No. Since the teacher specifically stated that the
project is being created for distribution over the Web, this is not a
fair use of any of the listed copyrighted materials and permission
should be obtained. See SCENARIO U.
7. Student Project on the Internet with Restricted Access
SCENARIO U: Same facts as SCENARIO T, however, access to
each student's Web page will be restricted to other students in the
class.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. This should be considered fair use.
8. Use of Commercial Videotape
SCENARIO V: An instructor is teaching a class delivered on
cable television or via two-way interactive video (GSAMS), and she
uses a commercial videotape (either in its entirety or a portion),
which is sold for instructional purposes, during a class to illustrate
a concept covered in the discussion.
QUESTION a: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. She is using a commercial video for its intended
purpose. Moreover, it is being used to illustrate a concept connected with the class discussion.
QUESTION b: Same facts as SCENARIO V, but the class is
distributed over the Internet. Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: This is a fair use only if access over the Internet is
restricted.
QUESTION c: Same facts as SCENARIO V, but the videotape
is not "educational" in orientation. Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Distribution over two-way interactive video or cable
television controlled by the institution would be a fair use, as would
restricted distribution over the Internet. Unrestricted distribution
over the Internet is not a fair use.
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9. Taping On-Air Programming
SCENARIO W: A faculty member records a segment from a
television program. The segment will be shown in a GSAMS class
the following day. The remote sites will record the class in the
event of technical difficulties.
QUESTION: Is the showing of the recording considered fair use?
ANSWER: Yes.
10. Retention of Tape of On-Air Programming
QUESTION: Assume there are technical difficulties in SCENAR10 W and the remote sites replay the tape containing the program
segment. Is that a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. The use is for instructional purposes.
11. Retention of Videotape of Copyrighted Material
SCENARIO X: Institution E records a two-way interactive video
(GSAMS) class that contains copyrighted works. The tapes are
kept for the entire quarter to serve as review for students who may
have missed a class or as backup in the event of technical difficulties. At the end of the term, the tapes are erased.
QUESTION: Is this fair use?
ANSWER: Yes.
12. Use of a Videotape of a GSAMS Class ContainingCopyrighted Material
QUESTION: What if the professor who conducted the class in
SCENARIO X decides to show the tape to her continuing education
class (or to a community group)? Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes, showing the tapes to her continuing education
class is fair use if she is using the material for educational
purposes and no admission fee is charged. Showing the tape to a
community group may or may not be a fair use. The fact that the
user of the tapes is a professor does not make the showing of the
tape to a community group an educational use. One would need to
conduct a fair use analysis.
13. Rebroadcast of a Videotape of a Two-Way Interactive Video
(GSAMS) Class Containing Copyrighted Material
SCENARIO Y: Institution E records a two-way interactive video
class that contains copyrighted text, video, audio, and photographs
that are relevant to the class. Institution E rebroadcasts the
videotape to a class at Institution F.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. It is fair use since instruction is occurring.
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F. ELECTRONIC COURSE RESERVES

1. Placinga Book Chapter on the Library'sElectronic Reserves
SCENARIO Z: A professor wants to add a book chapter to the
library's electronic reserve system.
QUESTION: Is this a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. The chapter may be added if access to the
system is limited to students enrolled in the class.
2. Retention of Book Chapters on Electronic Reserve
SCENARIO AA: The professor in SCENARIO Z will be teaching
the same course for three successive terms.
QUESTION: Is leaving a book chapter on the electronic reserve
system for this period of time a fair use?
ANSWER: Yes. The use is fair if access is limited to students
and the work is out of print and not readily available. However, if
the book is currently in print, then a fair use analysis using the
four fair use factors is required.
PART

III. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING
COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE

The following discussion, based on the copyright clause of the
U.S. Constitution, the copyright statute, and decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, provides the legal background necessary for
understanding copyright and fair use. The discussion should be
read in light of the fact that copyright is a highly regulated
statutory grant, a limited monopoly to serve the public interest in
preference to private interests.
A. UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW

1. The Copyright Clause. A proper understanding of copyright
law begins with the copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution, the
source of Congress' authority to enact copyright statutes. Contained in the intellectual property clause (which also contains the
patent clause), it reads: "The Congress shall have Power ...

To

promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times
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to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings."1 As a
careful reading of this language shows, the clause limits the power
it grants to the purpose for which the power is granted. That
purpose is to promote science, which means knowledge or learning
in the eighteenth-century usage of the word. Thus, it authorizes
Congress to grant copyright only to authors, only for their writings,
and only for limited times. The national legislature could not, for
example, constitutionally enact a statute providing for a perpetual
copyright.
The key to understanding the limits on Congress' power to enact
copyright legislation is the meaning of the "exclusive Right" that
Congress can grant. In 1789, the meaning of this phrase was clear:
it was the right to publish the work. Today, there are ways other
than publishing to market a work. Thus, the "exclusive Right"
today can be properly read as meaning the exclusive right of
authors to market their works, which retains the original function
of the phrase. The purpose of copyright-to promote learning-remains the same.
Originality-in the words of the copyright statute, "an original
work of authorship"-is a constitutional condition for copyright.
This condition is important because it means that copyright law
divides all writings into two categories: those that are copyrightable and those that are not.
Material that is not copyrightable is called public domain
material. Examples are: (1) facts and ideas (Sec. 102(b)); (2) works
of the U.S. Government (Sec. 105); (3) all material that is not
original with the author claiming copyright (Sec. 103); and (4)
works upon which the copyright has expired. Copyright law thus
has a major role in preserving the public domain.
While the purpose of copyright is to promote learning, there are
two obvious points sometimes overlooked: (1) the amount of public
domain material exceeds the amount of copyrighted material by far;
and (2) the public domain is as necessary to the promotion of
learning as copyright. Consequently, copyright's role in preserving
the public domain is as important as protecting the new writings
of authors.

'U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 c. 8.
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Preserving the public domain is specified by the copyright clause
of the Constitution, which requires a new writing and a limited
term for copyright, and by the copyright statute, which conforms to
these limitations. Since copyright requires a new work, it cannot
be used to capture old works from the public domain; since
copyright is limited to a definite term, all copyrighted works
eventually go into the public domain. Thus, two of the constitutional roles of copyright law are to preserve and to enhance the public
domain.
2. The Copyright Statute. Unlike the copyright clause, the
current copyright statute is long and complex, but the pattern of
Chapter 1 of the statute, the most important, is simple. After
defining key terms in section 101, that chapter: (1) states the
conditions for copyright; (2) excludes copyright for certain types of
material and works; (3) defines the types of copyrightable works; (4)
grants rights to the copyright holder in section 106; and (5) limits
those rights in sections 107-120.
The statutory condition for copyright, consistent with the
Constitution, is the creation of an original work of authorship fixed
in a tangible medium of expression (Sec. 102(a)). The statute,
however, puts ideas (Sec. 102(b)) and works of the U.S. Government
(Sec. 105) in the public domain by excluding them from copyright
protection. The pattern-conditions, defined rights, and limitations
on those rights-is that of a highly regulated statutory grant.
One of the most subtle aspects of the copyright statute is that it
provides copyright for works that contain public domain material
and are original only in part. To make this copyright constitutional, Congress excluded public domain material (and other material
unoriginal to the author) from copyright protection even though it
is contained within a copyrighted work. This explains why there
are three kinds of copyrights with varying degrees of protection: (1)
creative works (which consist entirely of original material like
novels, dramas, and poems) are entitled to plenary protection (Sec.
102(a)); (2) compilations (collections of independently copyrightable
works or data, for example, an anthology of short stories or entries
in a library catalog) (Sec. 103), entitled to only limited protection;
and (3) derivative works (works based on other works, such as a
motion picture based on a novel) (Sec. 103), also entitled to only
limited protection.
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The scope of the copyright monopoly is thus commensurate with
the amount of originality necessary to create each type of protected
work. This follows from the fact that the originality of a creative
work is in composing it, the originality of a compilation is in
arranging pre-existing material, and of a derivative work in
transforming another work. In short, Congress was careful to limit
the scope of copyright protection to the original material of the
author claiming copyright. It should be noted that a gathering of
independently copyrightable works is a compilation that is called
a collective work, and that the individual works themselves may be
entitled to plenary copyright protection independently of the partial
protection provided by the compilation copyright.
In section 106, Congress grants the copyright holder six rights:
(1) to reproduce the work in copies; (2) to prepare derivative works;
(3) to distribute copies of the work to the public; (4) to perform the
work publicly; (5) to display the work publicly; and (6) to perform
audio digital recordings publicly (added by amendment some
twenty years after the statute was enacted).
These rights are said to be exclusive, but-consistent with the
regulatory scheme of the statute-they are subject to limitations
contained in the fourteen sections following section 106. These
limitations explain the Supreme Court's statement that "the
2
copyright holder's dominion is subject to precisely defined limits."
The copyright holder, for example, has the exclusive right to
market a work by distributing copies publicly (Sec. 106(3)). And
the copyright holder has the exclusive right to market the public
performance of a work, but not its private use. One can sing the
copyrighted song in the shower, but not on the radio (Sec. 106(4)).
Similarly, owners control the market for public display of a
copyrighted painting but not its private display in one's home (Sec.
106(5)).
3. Supreme Court Decisions. The copyright statute is to be
interpreted in light not only of the copyright clause, but also of the
copyright decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, it is
primarily in reference to these decisions that a very important, but
subtle, point becomes clear. The subject of the copyright statute is

2 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529, 533 (1985).
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proprietary rights in the copyright, not in the work itself.3 Thus,
the copyright statute provides that the copyright holder has certain
rights to which the work is subject, and it is only these rights that
can be transferred or infringed.
The U.S. Supreme Court dealt with this issue in a case near the
beginning of the twentieth century, when a copyright holder had
sued a retailer claiming that the retailer had to charge the price
that the publisher set for the book. The Court rejected the
copyright holder's claim of a right to control proprietary rights in
a book (technically a copy of the copyrighted work) that it had sold.
The result was what in legal terms is called the "first sale"
doctrine.4 That is, the Court held that the copyright holder's
marketing monopoly as to a particular book ends with the first sale
of that book. The monopoly, of course, ends only for that particular
copy and does not otherwise affect the copyright.
The first sale doctrine means that the purchaser of a book can
subsequently do with it as he or she pleases, give it away, resell it,
or burn it. This right is based on the distinction between the
physical object in which the work is contained and the copyright of
the work. The purchaser of the book owns the book, the copyright
holder owns the copyright. It follows, then, that there is a
distinction between the use of the work and the use of the copyright of the work. Thus, the purchaser of a copy of a work can use
that copy as he or she wishes, but may not use the copyright except
as a matter of fair use or with permission.
The copyright statute codifies the distinction between the work
and the copyright in section 202. Thus, the transfer of a book
containing the work is not a transfer of the copyright (or any of the
rights of copyright) of the work; and the transfer of the copyright
is not a transfer of any rights in a book in which the work is
contained (Sec. 202).
To summarize, copyright law means that: (1) copyright is a
monopoly that provides authors the right to sell copies of their
work; (2) the monopoly is regulated in the public interest; (3) the
monopoly of a particular copy ends when that copy is sold; and (4)
a user is free thereafter to make use of the work contained in that
copy, but not to make use of the copyright of that work.
s See infra Part

V.c., Copyright Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, for cases so

holding.

4 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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B. UNDERSTANDING FAIR USE

The most important of the statutory limitations on copyright is
fair use, which applies to all copyrighted works and all uses
granted in section 106.
The fair use statute is section 107 of the copyright statute, which
is printed in full in Part IV. It provides that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies," is
not an infringement of copyright. As exemplars of fair use, it lists
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research" and provides
four non-exclusive factors to be used in determining whether a use
is fair. They are: (1) the purpose of the use, including whether the
use is a commercial use or for non-profit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the work; (3) the amount used; and (4) the effect on
the marketing of the work. These factors are discussed below.
The purpose of fair use is twofold: to protect the copyright
holder's market monopoly while preventing the market monopoly
from being used to inhibit (rather than promote) learning. But
these goals are often confused when the use of a work involves
copying. Thus, it is helpful to compare fair use conduct with
infringing conduct to avoid the confusion.
The copyright statute defines infringement as the violation of
"any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,"5 which
includes the right to reproduce thework in copies. One who copies
the work without permission, therefore, would appear to have
infringed the copyright. But "the fair use statute says, "[tihe fair
use of a work, including such use by reproduction in copies ...

is

not an infringement of copyright" (emphasis added)." This means
that the same type of conduct-reproduction of a work in
copies-may be a fair use in one case or an infringement in another
and this is the major reason for confusion as to the scope of the fair
use right.
The primary source of the confusion is the language in section
106(1), which grants the copyright owner the "exclusive" right to
reproduce the work in copies subject to limitations. A right subject
6

17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).

6 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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to limitations is not totally exclusive, it is merely a right subject to
limitations. Although these limitations include the right of fair
use, which, in the language of the statute, includes use by copying,
copyright holders prefer to read the statute otherwise. See, for
example, copyright notices in many books that purport to deny
anyone the right to copy any portion of the book without the
consent of the copyright holder. The plain meaning of the statute,
however, precludes this interpretation, and it is clear that the
copyright holder's right to copy is not absolute.
Since a truly absolute right to reproduce in copies would create
an absolute monopoly to market a work, there are four persuasive
items of evidence (apart from the language in section 107) indicating that the copyright holder's right to copy is not absolute. The
first is that the limitations on the copyright holder's right to copy
are limitations on the marketing right. But the marketing right is
not absolute because of the first sale doctrine, which says that the
copyright owner's marketing monopoly is exhausted with the first
sale and others can then sell the copy. To say that the reproduction of the work in copies is an absolute right is inconsistent with
the fact that the right to distribute the copies is limited to the right
to distribute them to the public.
The second item of evidence is based on the many rulings of the
U.S. Supreme Court that copyright is intended primarily to benefit
the public's rather than the copyright holders' interest, which
cannot be so if the right to copy is absolute.
The third item of evidence is the specific ruling of the Supreme
Court---made in response to claims that the making of one copy of
a copyrighted motion picture off-the-air (under the current
copyright statute) was infringement-that copyright has never
granted to the copyright holder absolute rights, which clearly
qualifies all "exclusive" rights of the copyright holder.'
The fourth item of evidence is the Supreme Court's ruling that
there is a constitutional right for a user to copy uncopyrightable

' "While the law has never recognized an author's right to absolute control of his work,
the natural tendency of legal rights to express themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion
of all else is particularly pronounced in the history of the constitutionally sanctioned
monopolies of the copyright and the patent." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417, 432 n.13, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 674 n.13 (1984).
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material from a copyrighted work, a right that could not be
exercised if the copyright owner's right to copy were absolute.'
C. FAIR USE AND NEW COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY

The application of new communications technology created by
computers developed after Congress enacted the 1976 Copyright
Act. Consequently, application of fair use to the transmission of
material by computer, e.g. on the Internet, merits special mention.
Originally, fair use was a judicial doctrine that one author could
make fair use of another author's work in creating his or her own
new work. If the amount used was fair, the method or scope of
distribution made no difference. If, for example, Author X made a
fair use of the work of Author Y, the fact that Author X's book sold
a million copies did not divest the material of its fair use status.
Today, fair use is a statutory right that applies to all copyrighted
works and all rights of the copyright holder, and whether a use is
fair is to be determined by applying the four factors listed in the
statute. Since the method of distribution is not one of the statutory
factors, it follows that the distribution of material by electronic
rather than print media is not the decisive issue. The important
point is that if the amount used does not unlawfully interfere with
the copyright holder's marketing monopoly, it is a fair use.
D.

FAIR USE APPLIED TO COPYRIGHT AS A MARKETING MONOPOLY

In view of the regulatory nature of copyright as manifested in the
marketing monopoly limitation, to apply the fair use statute it is
useful to begin with three basic propositions: (1) there is a
distinction between the work and the copyright and thus between
the use of the work and the use of the copyright; (2) there are
different kinds of copyrighted works and of fair use; and (3) the
application of fair use depends upon the kind of work being used
and the kind of use one is making of the work. The end result is
that fair use must be determined on a case-by-case (or
work-by-work) basis.
8

Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,349, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275,
1279 (1991).
9
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1965
(1994) (the fair use doctrine 'calls for case-by-case analysis").
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The Crucial Distinction Between the Work and the
1.
Copyright--and the Use of Each. The ultimate issue in copyright
law is the location of the appropriate line of demarcation between
the marketing rights of copyright holders and the fair use rights of
users of copyrighted material. The ability to locate this line
depends, in part at least, upon understanding that the work itself
is separate and distinct from the copyright of the work, a point
proven by the fact that works continue to exist even after their
copyrights have expired and the works have passed into the public
domain. The U.S. Supreme Court made this distinction clear as
long ago as 1852. "[Tlhe property in the copy-right is regarded as
a different and distinct right, wholly detached from the manuscript,
or any other physical existence, and will not pass with the manuscript unless included by express words in the transfer."'0 The
continued relevance of this holding is demonstrated by the fact that
Congress codified it in section 202 of the current copyright statute,
which reads in part: "Ownership of a copyright... is distinct from
ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied." 1
There are three components of a copyrighted work: the work
itself; the original fixation of the work; and copies of the original
copy (the fixation) made for the market. Since copyright is a series
of rights to which a given work is subject, copyright does not give
the copyright holder (even the author) ownership of the work, only
the ownership of rights. One who exercises a right of the copyright
holder uses the copyright; one who does not uses only the work (or
the copy of the work). This distinction is what makes so important
the definition of the copyright owner's right to copy as only the
right to copy for the purpose of marketing the copies made.
One who copies--or makes another use of-a work for a non-market purpose (such as teaching, scholarship, or research) uses the
work; one who copies-or makes another use of-a work for the
market uses the copyright. The point is that a purchaser pays for
the use of the work when he or she buys a copy of it. The distinction between the work and the copyright thus enables one to
distinguish the use of the work, which does not interfere with the
'0 Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528, 531 (1852).
" 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
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owner's marketing right, and the use of the copyright, which does.
Recognizing that a use of the work never involves a use of the
copyright, but a use of the copyright always involves a use of the
work helps avoid confusion.
2. The Three Types of Copyrightable Works: Creative Works,
Compilations,and Derivative Works. The three kinds of copyrighted works are: (1) a creative work (Sec. 102(a)); (2) a compilation
(Sec. 103); and (3) a derivative work (Sec. 103). Only original
portions of these works are protected by copyright, and since fair
use is necessary only when using copyrighted material, it follows
that the application of fair use criteria will differ for different type
works. A novel will contain more original material than a compilation.
3. The Three Kinds of Fair Use: Creative, Personal, and
Educational. There are also three kinds of fair use: (1) creative
fair use; (2) personal fair use; and (3) educational fair use.
Creative fair use involves the use of another work in creating one's
own work; personal use involves the use of a copyrighted work for
learning or entertainment; and educational fair use involves the
use of copyrighted works for teaching, scholarship, or research. As
a general proposition, creative fair use involves a use of the
copyright; personal and educational fair use involve only a use of
the work, as discussed below.
a. CreativeFairUse: Authors Using Other Copyrighted Works
to Create a New Work. Creative fair use is use by one author of
another author's work in creating his or her own original work. It
is the earliest-and during the nineteenth century was the
only-form of fair use. Thus, in his nineteenth-century classic on
copyright, Eaton S. Drone said:
It is a recognized principle that every author, compiler
or publisher may make ... use[] of a. .. rival or other
publication. The recognition of this doctrine is essential
to the growth of knowledge; as it would obviously be a
hindrance to learning if every work were a sealed book
to all subsequent authors. The law, therefore, wisely
allows a "fair use" to be made of every copyrighted
production.... 2
12 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT

BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 386-87 (1972).
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The use of another's work to create one's own often means also
the use of the copyright of that work, since it may interfere with
the marketing right of the copyright holder. An author who
abridges another author's work, for instance, makes use of the work
that is so extensive it is also a use of the copyright. It is when the
use of a work extends to the use of the copyright in creating a new
work that creative fair use comes into play. The essential question
is always how much of an intrusion on the copyright of the original
work will be fair.
The three factors to aid in this determination were named in the
1841 case, Folsom v. Marsh, that created the right of fair use, when
the court said that one must "look to the nature and objects of the
selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and
the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the
profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work."13 Thus, the
factors were: (1) the nature of the work, (2) the amount used, and
(3) the effect on the market-the same factors, except for purpose
of the use, now in section 107. (The purpose of the use, the first
factor listed in section 107, was not listed in the Folsom case
because that factor implies other kinds of fair use-personal and
educational fair use-that were neither necessary nor recognized
until the 1976 Copyright Act.)
b. PersonalFairUse: Use of Copyrighted Works for One's Own
Learning or Enjoyment. Personal fair use is a use of the work by
an individual for his or her learning or entertainment. For
example, copying for scholarship and research are personal uses
permitted by section 107, as is taping a copyrighted motion picture
off-the-air for later viewing-a personal fair use permitted by ruling
of the U.S. Supreme Court." This is consistent with the traditional view of one's right to use a copy of a work, e.g. a book, as stated
by Justice Brewer of the U.S. Supreme Court when he said:
[Tihe effect of a copyright is not to prevent any reasonable use of the book which is sold. I go to a book-store,
and I buy a book which has been copyrighted. I may
use that book for reference, study, reading, lending,
13 Folsom

14Sony

v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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copying passages from it at my will. I may not duplicate that book, and thus put it upon the market, for in
so doing I would infringe the copyright. But merely
taking extracts from it, merely using it, in no manner
infringes upon the copyright.1 5
Most authorities now treat personal use as being under the fair
use umbrella. But since personal fair use is a use of the work-not
the copyright-it is always a protected use.
c. Educational Fair Use: Use of Copyrighted Works for
Teaching or for Scholarship or Research. Educational fair use, as
the statute makes clear, is a use of the work for teaching, scholarship, or research. There is some overlap between creative use,
educational use, and personal use since copying is necessary for all
three. This may be one reason that Congress in the 1976 Copyright
Act took special pains to protect educational fair use, as shown by
four provisions of the statute: (1) the use of works for "teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use)" as an exemplar of fair
use (Sec. 107); (2) the distinction between commercial and nonprofit
educational use (Sec. 107(1)), a superfluous distinction unless it
means special protection for educational use; (3) the provision that
fair use overrides the limitations on library photocopying (Sec.
108(f)(4)); and (4) the good-faith defense for employees of nonprofit
educational institutions, libraries, and archives (Sec. 504(cX2)).
It should be noted that two cases have dealt indirectly with
educational fair use, Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.'6
and Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services. 7
Both of these cases were infringement actions against a commercial
copyshop that copied coursepack materials for classroom use at the
request of professors. Both courts held that the commercial
copyshops were not entitled to the right of fair use, but it is worthy
of note that the Princeton University Press court did not decide
whether "it would be fair use for the students or professors to make
their own copies," because "the copying complained of here was

Stover v. Lathrop, 33 F. 348, 349 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888) (emphasis added).
758 F. Supp. 1522, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
17 99 F.3d 1381, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (6th Cir. 1996).
16
16
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performed on a profit-making basis by a commercial enterprise.""8
It is also worthy of note that there were three very strong dissents
in that case, one of which noted that "[t]here is no legal precedent
and no legal history that supports our Court's reading of this
phrase ["multiple copies for classroom use"] in a way that outlaws
the widespread practice of copying for classroom use by teachers
and students," and that the Supreme Court, the only court whose
rulings apply nationwide, has not ruled on the issue.1"
Kinko's was an order of the U.S. District Court of the Southern
District of New York and such orders are binding only in that
district. Moreover, the Attorney General of the State of Georgia
has issued an unofficial opinion contrary to Kinko's (and Princeton
University Press)(Attorney General's Opinion No. U96-4 [Feb. 15,
1996]). The Opinion takes the position that the plain language of
the statute ("multiple copies for classroom use" is an exemplar of
fair use) means what it says.
A third case to be noted is American Geophysical Union v. Texaco
Inc.,20 which dealt with photocopying by a for-profit corporation
for research purposes (the copies were made by a scientist in the
research lab). The court held that the for-profit corporation was
not entitled to the right of fair use, but said "our opinion does not
decide the case that would arise if Chickering [the copier] were a
professor or an independent scientist engaged in copying and
creating files for independent research.""
4. The Fair Use Factorsin Relation to the Type of Work and the
Kind of Use. The fair use statute lists four non-exclusive
factors-purpose of the use, nature of the work, amount used, and
market effect-in determining whether a use is fair (that is,
whether the use improperly intrudes upon the market monopoly of
the copyright holder).
The statute, however, does not provide any guidance for using
the factors, except for distinguishing commercial and non-profit
educational use in factor one. Presumably, this is because fair use
is a fact-intensive determination and all the factors are to be

'198 ld. at 1389.
d. at 1394.
'* 60 F.3d 913, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (2d Cir. 1994).

2Id. at 916.
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applied to each work alleged to have been infringed on a
work-by-work basis. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that,
contrary to lower court rulings, the fourth factor is no more
important than the other three, and that all the factors are to be
considered together.
The important point is that the purpose of the factors is to
protect the marketing monopoly of the copyright owner against
unfair intrusion and both the type of work and the kind of use
involved must be related to that purpose. Further, the factors are
not exclusive, and the relevance of the additional factors will vary
according to the type of work and the kind of use intended.
5. Fair Use and the Rights of the Copyright Holder. Although
fair use is applied most often when the copyrighted work is copied,
the fair use statute does not limit fair use to the reproduction right
or to any one right of the copyright holder. Since fair use applies
to all the copyright holder's rights, the preparation of a derivative
work (for example, a parody) and the public distribution, public
performance, or public display of a work (as well as copying) can be
a fair use.
Generally, however, the key element in determining whether a
use is fair or not is the amount of the work used. If the amount
copied is so much that it violates the copyright holder's right to
reproduce the work in copies, it is infringing (and the same
infringer can also be guilty of infringing by distributing, performing, or displaying the work publicly). But if the amount copied
conforms to fair use criteria, the fact that the portion copied is
distributed, performed, or displayed publicly does not deprive the
copied material of its fair use status. For example, to quote a verse
from a long copyrighted poem that is heard by millions of people
viewing a television broadcast does not change the fair use into an
infringing use.
The above reasoning applies equally to creative fair use and
educational fair use, but not to personal use. As a fair use,
personal use is unique in that it involves only a use of the work,
not the copyright, and is always a protected use. For example, to
copy a copyrighted motion picture off-the-air for later viewing is a
personal use of the work.
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E. NONSTATUTORY FAIR USE GUIDELINES

The promulgation of "fair use guidelines" by various groups has
become a common practice since the "Classroom Guidelines" were
included in the House Report on the 1976 Act. These guidelines
are quantitative in nature, providing the precise amount of a work
to be used. For example, the "Classroom Guidelines" permit a
teacher to make a single copy of a chapter from a book or an article
from a periodical or newspaper "for his or her individual scholarly
research or use in teaching or preparation to teach a class,"
however, multiple copies for classroom use must meet the tests of
brevity and spontaneity. Brevity is defined as "a complete article,
story or essay of less than 2,500 words, or (b) an excerpt from any
prose work of not more than 1,000 words or 10% of the work,
22
whichever is less, but in any event a minimum of 500 words."
However, since any set of quantitative rules has the effect of
overriding the fair use statute, it is important to understand that
such guidelines (including the "Classroom Guidelines") are not law
and thus cannot be legally binding. Quantifying fair use is
contrary to the statutory right of fair use, which authorizes the
user to exercise his or her judgment in accordance with the
provisions of section 107. Private agreements do not eviscerate
constitutionally based rights granted by congressional statutes-at
least for those who are not parties to the agreement.
F. OVERBROAD COPYRIGHT NOTICES

Copyright notices are often inflated to read as if the copyright
holder's right to copy is absolute, saying, for example, that no one
may copy any portion of the book in any manner without the
written permission of the publisher." Literal compliance with
such inflated notices would do away with the right of fair use, a

H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69 (1976).
' The copyright notice of the Association of American Publishers 1994 Industry Statistics
reads in full as follows:
© 1995 by Association of American Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved.
No part of this report may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without express
permission from the Association of American Publishers, Inc., 71 Fifth Avenue, New York,

NY 10003-3004.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

41

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6

284

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

clear signal that such notices are incorrect.

[Vol. 5:243

This conclusion is

supported by the 1991 holding of the U.S. Supreme Court that
there is a constitutionalright to copy public domain material from
a copyrighted work, which could not be exercised if the copyright
holder's right to copy were absolute. 2 ' As recently as 1994, the
Court said: "We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that
Congress has authorized ... are limited in nature and must
ultimately serve the public good."' In other cases, the Court has
said copyright "protection has never accorded the copyright owner
complete control over all possible uses of his work; the ultimate
aim of copyright is "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good,"27 and "[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' "' These rulings, of course, would mean
nothing if the copyright holder's right to copy were absolute.
Copyright notices that assert rights of the copyright holder
beyond those granted by the copyright statute are extra-legal and
inefficacious. The statute provides that a copyright notice shall
consist of the word "Copyright" or the letter "C" in a circle, the
name of the copyright owner, and the date. One may disregard
extraneous matter in copyright notices and rely on the copyright
statute for determining what may be copied as a matter of fair use.
G.

CONCLUSION

The application of the fair use statute, section 107, requires
respect for the rights of copyright holders without compromising
one's own rights. This is not a matter of selfishness, for to the
extent users compromise their own rights in the fair use of
copyrighted material, they compromise the rights of all users and
ultimately defeat one of the purposes of the fair use: to keep the
expanded copyright monopoly within its constitutional boundaries.
The effort requires the exercise of sound judgment and common
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
z' Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1885 (1994).
2 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
'7 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65,
67 (1975).
2 Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
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sense that depends in large part upon understanding that copyright
law is not an end in itself, but a means to an end-the promotion
of learning-which is essential to a free society.
The 1976 Copyright Act states the rights of copyright holders in
great detail, an indication of the importance of regulating copyright
and maintaining an appropriate balance between the rights of
holders and the rights of users. Despite their complexity, however,
the rules as to the rights of copyright holders-apart from the
adaptation right-can be reduced to one: The exclusive right to sell
copies of the work to the public, to perform the work publicly, or to
display the work publicly, depending upon the type of work. That
is, the copyright holder's right is essentially a monopoly for
marketing the work.
The fair use statute provides in plain language that "multiple
copies for classroom use" and copying for scholarship and research
are exemplars of fair use. The rule of thumb for copying for these
purposes, then, can be stated as follows: Does the copying interfere
with the selling of the work in the marketplace? To put the point
another way: Is the copying a substitute for purchasing a work
that is readily available? If the answer is no, the presumption is
that educational use is a use of the work, which is always a fair use
consistent with the constitutional purpose of copyright, the
promotion of knowledge and learning.
PART IV. LEGAL AUTHORITIES
The following legal authorities are constitutional, statutory, and
decisional law, although the decisions are limited to those of the
U.S. Supreme Court. They are provided for purposes of reference.
Comments are provided for additional background.
A. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (ARTICLE I,
SECTION 1, CLAUSE 8)
The Congress shall have Power ... To Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries....

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

43

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6

286

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 5:243

Comment: The copyright clause is in the intellectual property
clause, which also contains the patent clause. The italicized
portions above are the copyright clause. The source of this
language is the title of the first English copyright statute, called
the Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, c. 19, enacted in 1710, which also
served as the model for the first U.S. Copyright Act in 1790. The
title of the English statute reads:
An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the
copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of
such copies, during the time therein mentioned.'
Apparently the copyright clause is the only provision of the
Constitution for which we can identify its precise source. The
English copyright statute is thus an annotation of the copyright
clause, and since the English act applied only to printed books, "the
exclusive Right" in the copyright clause was probably intended to
be the right to publish the writings, that is a monopoly for
publishing books. In view of the various media by which a work
can be marketed, the right today can best be interpreted as "the
exclusive Right" to market work.
B.

SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT STATUTE

(17 u.s.c.

§ 101 ET SEQ.)
1. Sec. 101. Definitions
a. A "collective work" is a work, such as a periodical issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions,
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are
assembled into a collective whole.
b. A "compilation"is a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term
"compilation" includes collective works.
c. 'Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed,

2

Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.).
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and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other than
a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
d. A work is "created"when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord
for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time,
the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate
work.
e. A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work
of authorship, is a "derivative work."
f To "display" a work means to show a copy of it, either
directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other
device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially.
g. "Publication"is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of
a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or
phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication.
A public performance or display of a work does not of itself
constitute publication.
Comment: There are three points to be noted. First, not all the
statutory definitions are listed. Second, the statute does not define
a creative work (the traditional paradigm for copyright as an
author's right), but it describes compilations and derivative works
in some detail. Thus, it distinguishes between the kinds of
compilations, that is a compilation of data and collective works.
This is because rights as to compilations and derivative works are
limited by the requirement of originality, as section 103 makes
clear. Third, the definitions of "copies" and "created" make clear
that a work is distinct from a copy of the work. Because a work
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cannot be protected unless it is fixed in a copy, it follows that it is
the copy that is protected, not the work. The fact that the copy is
congruent with the work does not change this, because the work
cannot be protected unless and until it is fixed.
2. Sec. 102. Subject Matter of Copyright: In General
a. Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship
include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
b. In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.
Comment: Section 102(a) states the constitutional condition for
copyright, the writing of an author, in the words "an original work
of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression." This
condition must be fulfilled before the other provisions of the statute
comes into play.
The most important change from prior statutes in section 102(a)
is that copyright exists from the moment of fixation. Under prior
statutes, copyright did not exist until the work was published (a
means of insuring public access). The list of the categories of
copyrightable works is primarily for the convenience of the
Copyright Office, which registers copyrights, and has no substantive effect. A literary work, for example, cannot be protected by
copyright if it is not original.
Section 102(b) excludes ideas from copyright protection and is the
codification of a nineteenth century U.S. Supreme Court decision,
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Baker v. Selden,3 ° which held that copyright would not protect a
system of bookkeeping.3 1
3. Sec. 103. Subject Matter of Copyright: Compilations and
Derivative Works
a. The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102
includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a
work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists
does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has
been used unlawfully.
b. The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends
only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work,
and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.
The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect
or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any
copyright protection in the preexisting material.
Comment: Section 103 limits the copyright protection for
compilations and derivative works to the original components of
those works and should be read in light of the definitions of
"compilations" and "derivative works" in section 101.
4. Sec. 105. Subject Matter of Copyright: United States
Government Works. Copyright protection under this title is not
available for any work of the United States Government, but the
United States Government is not precluded from receiving and
holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or
otherwise.
Comment: This section emphasizes that works of the U.S.
Government cannot be protected by copyright. The section does not
apply to works of state governments.
5. Section 106. Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works. Subject
to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
a. to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;

30 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
31 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

47

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6

290

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 5:243

b. to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
c. to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending;
d. in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
e. in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and
f. in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Comment: Section 106 states the rights of the copyright holder.
Three points are important: (1) the copyright holder must comply
with section 102(a) before these rights are available; (2) even if a
work is copyrighted, the copyright does not protect public domain
material within the work; and (3) even though the rights are said
to be exclusive, they are subject to the limitations in sections
following section 106, the most important of which is the fair use
statute, section 107.
The basic issue about section 106 is whether section 106(1) is an
absolute right to copy. Since the rights of section 106 are subject
to sections 107 through 120, the copyright holder's right to
reproduce copies cannot be absolute. In view of the limitations on
Congress' power, there is serious doubt that Congress could grant
the copyright owner the absolute right to reproduce copies.
6. Sec. 107. Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use.
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include:
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a. the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
b. the nature of the copyrighted work;
c. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
d. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished
shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made
upon consideration of all the above factors.
Comment: Section 107 is a statute within a statute. The
important point about the section is that it grants rights to users
and is to be interpreted accordingly. Arguably, without section 107,
the 1976 Copyright Act would be unconstitutional in light of the
limitations in the copyright clause on Congress' power to enact
copyright legislation. Thus, without section 107, section 106(1)
would give the copyright owner the absolute right to copy, which
would mean that copyright could be used to inhibit rather than to
promote learning.
7. Sec. 201. Ownership of Copyright.
a. Initial Ownership. Copyright in a work protected under
this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The
authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work.
b. Works Made for Hire. In the case of a work made by hire,
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author for purposes of this title, and unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Comment: Section 201(a) makes clear that ownership of a
copyright vests initially in the author. Thus, publishers hold
copyrights as assignees of authors. Section 201(b) is what is called
a legal fiction, that is a proposition that has legal effect but is not
true as a matter of fact. The fiction in this case is that the
employer of an author for whom the work is prepared is the author
of the work. It is necessary to use a fiction to place the copyright
in the employer, because the copyright clause enables Congress to
grant copyright only to authors.
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An important point about section 201(a) is that it deals only with
ownership of the copyright, not the work. From this, it follows that
the copyright statute itself deals only with the ownership of the
right, not of the work. Indeed, the copyright clause does not enable
Congress to grant ownership of writings, only an "exclusive Right"
to which writings are subject.
8. Sec. 202. Ownership of Copyright as Distinctfrom Ownership
of Material Object. Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the
exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of
any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of
ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord
in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights
in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence
of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any
exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any
material object.
Comment: Section 202 is consistent with the view that the
subject of the copyright statute is ownership of the copyright, not
the work. Thus, it makes clear that ownership of the copyright is
separate from the physical object in which the work is embodied,
that is the copy, as defined in section 101. This view is consistent
with the U.S. Supreme Court rulings.
The statute is much longer and more complex than these excerpts
indicate. A copy of the complete statute is available from the
Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., and, of
course, the statute may be examined in any law library. It is Title
17 of the United States Code.
C.

COPYRIGHT DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are the law of the land the
same as a statute enacted by Congress. Once rendered, only the
Court can change the law that a decision contains, unless Congress
enacts a statute to overturn it. If the decision is based on the U.S.
Constitution, however, not even Congress can overturn it. Only an
amendment to the Constitution can change constitutional law.
The Supreme Court has rendered relatively few copyright
decisions in its two-hundred year history, but those that it has
rendered establish the constitutional parameters of copyright, and

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss1/6

50

Patterson: Regents Guide to Understanding Copyright and Educational Fair Use

1997]

REGENTS COPYRIGHT GUIDE

293

thus, are critical to an interpretation of the copyright statute. The
following cases are the most important for this purpose. Each is
discussed under a heading stating the point for which the case is
discussed.
1. CopyrightIs a Statutory Grant,Not Common Law Property.
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). This case was the
Supreme Court's first copyright case. A former reporter of the
Supreme Court, Wheaton, who published the Court's decisions,
sued his successor, Richard Peters, who reprinted Wheaton's
reports along with the reports of later decisions that he published.
Wheaton depended upon royalties from the sale of his reports as
compensation for his work as reporter and sued Peters for copyright
infringement.
Wheaton claimed that in addition to the statutory copyright, an
author was entitled to a copyright under the common law by reason
of the natural law. An author creates a work, his lawyers argued,
and it is only right and just that he or she have the copyright of
that work (in perpetuity).
The Court rejected Wheaton's argument, and said:
That an author, at common law, has a property in his
manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one
who deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining a
copy endeavors to realize a profit by its publication,
cannot be doubted; but this is a very different right from
that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in
the future publication of the work, after the author shall
have published it to the world. The argument that a
literary man is as much entitled to the product of his
labor as any other member of society, cannot be controverted. And the answer is, that he realizes this product
by the transfer of his manuscripts, or in the sale of his
works, when first published. A book is valuable on
account of the matter it contains, the ideas it communicates, the instruction or entertainment it affords. Does
the author hold a perpetual property in these? Is there
an implied contract by every purchaser of his book, that
he may realise whatever instruction or entertainment
which the reading of it shall give, but shall not write out
or print its contents. (33 U.S. at 657)
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Congress... by this [copyright] act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it. (33
U.S. at 661)
Comment: The Wheaton case established the theoretical base for
American copyright law under the Constitution and that base still
exists today. Copyright is a limited monopoly granted by a statute
enacted by Congress. Had the Court ruled for Wheaton, the result
would have been that copyright is an unlimited monopoly granted
by judicial decisions rendered by judges.
2. Ownership of Copyright Is Separate From Ownership of a
Copy of the Work. Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852).
In this case, the defendant bought the copperplate of a map at a
sheriff's sale, and the question was whether the purchase of the
plate carried with it the right to print and publish the map
engraved upon it. The Court said it did not.
[T]he property acquired by the sale in the engraved
plate, and the copy-right of the map secured to the
author under the act of Congress, are altogether different and independent of each other, and have no necessary connection. The copy-right is an exclusive right to
the multiplication of the copies, for the benefit of the
author or his assigns, disconnected from the plate, or
any other physical existence. (55 U.S. at 530)
The Court analogized the property in the plate to the property in
a manuscript.
[T]he property in the copy-right is regarded as a different and distinct right, wholly detached from the manuscript, or any other physical existence, and will not pass
with the manuscript unless included by express words
in the transfer. (55 U.S. at 531)
Comment: Apparently this is the first Supreme Court case that
makes clear the distinction between the ownership of the copyright
and the ownership of a physical manifestation of the work.
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There are three versions of a work for copyright purposes: the
work, its fixation, and copies of the work as fixed. A work, of
course, can exist independently of fixation, which is the original
copy made by the author, e.g. a manuscript, which in turn is used
to make copies. The term fixation is used to distinguish the
original copy from the copies that are made from it to be sold, e.g.,
a book.
In this case, the copper plate was the original fixation owned by
the artist who created it and which, the Court held, could not be
used to make copies because the artist continued to own the
copyright; if the owner of the copper plate made copies, he would
be using the copyright.
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907). This
case was an infringement action against the American Tobacco
Company for copying and using a painting for advertising without
the permission of the copyright owner, to whom the artist had sold
the copyright. The defense was that the painting had been publicly
exhibited without a copyright notice, which the statute required.
The Court held that the notice did not have to be affixed to the
original painting, only copies of the painting. Therefore, the
copyright had not been lost by publicly displaying the painting
without the copyright notice.
[T]he purpose of the copyright law is not so much the
protection of the possession and control of the visible
thing, as to secure a monopoly having a limited time, of
the right to publish the production which is the result of
the inventor's thought. (207 U.S. at 293)
It is not the physical thing created, but the right of
printing, publishing, copying, etc., which is within the
statutory protection. (207 U.S. at 298)
While it is true that the property in copyright in this
country is the creation of statute, the nature and
character of the property grows out of the recognition of
the separate ownership of the right of copying from that
which inheres in the mere physical control of the thing
itself, and the statute must be read in the light of the
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intention of Congress to protect this intangible right as
a reward of the inventive genius that has produced the
work. (207 U.S. at 298-99)
Comment: This case provides the most extensive discussion of
the nature of copyright as separate from the work. The copyright
of the painting was distinct from, and did not pass with, the sale
of the painting. As the case makes clear, there is a difference
between the use of the copyright and the use of the work, and the
former is what the Copyright Act protects. The Court noted that
the painting (the work) was hanging in a dining room in England,
a traditional use of such a work.
3. The Copyright Holder Does Not Own the Copyrighted Work.
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The plaintiff in this case held
the copyright on a book about bookkeeping and sued for infringement because the defendant published a book using the same ideas
but expressing them in a different way. The Court said that if
plaintiff had the exclusive right to use the system explained in the
book, the defendant infringed; but if the system was not protected
by copyright, the defendant did not infringe. The Court held for
the defendant.
[Tihere is a clear distinction between the book, as such,
and the art which it is intended to illustrate. The mere
statement of the proposition is so evident, that it
requires hardly any argument to support it. (101 U.S. at
102)
Comment: Baker v. Selden is one of the two or three most
important copyright cases of the Supreme Court. It is usually cited
for the proposition that copyright cannot be used to protect ideas,
which is codified in section 102(b) of the Copyright Statute. The
traditional statement is that copyright protects the expression of
the ideas, but not the ideas themselves. The fact that copyright
cannot protect ideas means, of course, that the author cannot own
the ideas, which is the basis of the fundamental proposition for
which the case stands: The author of a work does not own the
work, only the copyright of the work.
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The decision was made long ago that the statute would provide
only rights to which the work is subject. Thus the copyright clause
does not empower Congress to grant ownership of the work to an
author, only ownership of the copyright.
4. Copyright Is a Series of Rights to Which a Work Is Subject.
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). This case was a
criminal prosecution for the transportation of stolen goods under a
federal statute. The goods that the defendant shipped were
"bootleg" phonorecords of Elvis Presley sound recordings, which the
defendant had acquired lawfully. The Court had to determine
"whether phonorecords that include the performance of copyrighted
musical compositions for the use of which no authorization has
been sought nor royalties paid are consequently 'stolen, converted
or taken by fraud' for purposes" of the statute under which
defendant was prosecuted. 473 U.S. at 216.
The Court held that they were not and reversed the conviction,
but in order to make its decision, it had to determine the nature of
copyright, and that is the importance of the case for understanding
copyright. The following quotes from the case, with citations
omitted, define copyright.
[Tihe Government's theory here would make theft,
conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropriation of statutorily protected rights in copyright. The
copyright owner, however, holds no ordinary chattel. A
copyright, like other intellectual property, comprises a
series of carefully defined and carefully delimited
interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact
protections. 'Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a
bundle of exclusive rights to the owner of the copyright.'
...

However, '[t]his protection has never accorded the

copyright owner complete control over all possible uses
of his work.'... For example, § 107 of the Copyright Act
'codifies the traditional privilege of other authors to
make 'fair use' of an earlier writer's work.'. . . Thus, the
property rights of a copyright holder have a character
distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of
simple 'goods, wares, [or] merchandise,' for the copyright
holder's dominion is subjected to precisely defined
limits....
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The infringer invades a statutorily defined province
guaranteed to the copyright holder alone. But he does
not assume physical control over the copyright; nor does
he wholly deprive its owner of its use. (473 U.S. at
216-217)
Comment: The Court's careful definition of copyright made clear
the nature of copyright as a series of limited rights to which a work
is subject; but perhaps it is most useful in making clear the
distinction between the copyright and the work. Although it was
clear that the defendant was wrong in infringing the copyright, that
did not give the U.S. Government, acting under a criminal statute,
the right to disregard the possessory property right the defendant
had in the physical manifestation of the recordings.
5. Copyright Does Not Negate Property Right of Purchaser of
Copy of the Work. Bobbs-MerrillCo. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
In this case, the copyright holder sought to use the copyright notice
to control the purchase price of books sold at retail by R.H. Macy
Co., which had purchased the books from a wholesaler. Macy Co.
sold the book for 89 cents, despite the following legend inserted
with the notice:
The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No
dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at
a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
copyright. The Bobbs-Merrill Company.
The copyright holder contended "the statute vested the whole
field of the right of exclusive sale in the copyright owner; that he
can part with it to another to the extent that he sees fit, and may
withhold to himself, by proper reservations, so much of the right as
he pleases." 210 U.S. at 349.
The Court said the precise question is:
[Dloes the sole right to vend.., secure to the owner of
the copyright the right, after a sale of the book to a
purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail,
to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy, because
of a notice in the book that a sale at a different price
will be treated as an infringement .... (210 U.S. at 350)
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In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the
owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell
his production, do not create the right to impose, by
notice, ... a limitation at which the book shall be sold
at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no
privity of contract.... What the complainant contends
for embraces not only the right to sell the copies, but to
qualify the title of a future purchaserby the reservation
of the right to have the remedies of the statute against
an infringer because of the printed notice of its purpose
so to do unless the purchaser sells at a price fixed in the
notice. To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales... would give a right
not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our
view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its
meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining
the legislative intent in its enactment. (210 U.S. 350-51)
(emphasis added)
Comment: A person who buys a book has a property right in that
book as a physical object. This case says that copyright cannot be
used to negate that property right by the use of a copyright notice
attempting to restrict that right. The same reasoning applies to
copyright notices that purport to restrict the right of the owner of
a book to copy any passages from the book.
6. Personal Use of Copyrighted Work Is a Fair Use. Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). This was a case
brought by motion picture studios against the manufacturer of
videocassette recorders that could be used to copy copyrighted
motion pictures off-the-air when broadcast on television. The
theory was that the manufacturer of a device capable of infringing
copyrighted works should be held liable for the use of that device
to infringe.
The purpose of the litigation was to get a ruling that copying
copyrighted motion pictures off-the-air was an infringement in
order to lay the predicate for a compulsory license, which could
work in several ways. One way would be to require the manufacturer to pay fees to a fund for every VCR manufactured or sold; the
other would be to impose a fee on blank tapes. Either way, of
course, the consumer would pay the fee. The license fees would be
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distributed to the copyright holders, that is, the motion picture
companies, according to a formula.
The Supreme Court sustained the fair use defense and thus
defeated the plan for compulsory license fees, and in doing so
discussed the philosophy underlying copyright.
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide
a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. (464 U.S. at 429)
[The task is to define] the scope of the limited monopoly
that should be granted to authors.., to give the public
appropriate access to their work product .... [Tihis task
involves a difficult balance between the interests of
authors ...
writings ...

in the control and exploitation of their
on the one hand, and society's competing

interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand.... (464 U.S. at 429)
[Copyright] protection has never accorded the copyright
owner complete control over all possible uses of his
work. ...

All reproductions of the work ...

are not

within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner;
some are in the public domain. Any individual may
reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use'; the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such
a use.... anyone.., who makes a fair use of the work
is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such
use. (464 U.S. at 432-33)
Comment: The Court held that an individual who copies a
copyrighted motion picture off-the-air to view it at a later time is
making a fair use of the copyright. Although the Court did not use
the term, this use is appropriately characterized as a personal use.
It is interesting to note that immediately after the Court handed
down the Sony decision, members of the motion picture industry
sought to have Congress overturn it by statute, claiming that
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otherwise the industry would be ruined. Congress refused. That
was in 1984, and the industry seems to be prospering very well
with the sale and rental of videocassettes, although people are still
free to copy the motion pictures off-the-air as a matter of personal
use.
7. Copyright Law Protects the Public Domain. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In this case, the
Court overruled some seventy years of precedent and held that the
white pages of telephone directories do not have sufficient originality to be protected by copyright; originality is a constitutional
condition for copyright protection. Said the Court:
Originality is a constitutional requirement. (499 U.S. at
346)
As one pair of commentators succinctly puts it: 'The
originality requirement is constitutionally mandated for
all works.' Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing the Law:
The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and
Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 719, 763,
n.155 (1989). (499 U.S. at 347)
The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean
that every element of the work may be protected.
Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright;
accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to
those components of a work that are original to the
author. (Patterson & Joyce 800-802) (499 U.S. at 348)
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used by others without compensation.
As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however,
this is not 'some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory
scheme.'... It is, rather, 'the essence of copyright,'...
and a constitutionalrequirement.(emphasis added). (499
U.S. at 349)

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1997

59

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6

302

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 5:243

Without a doubt, the 'sweat of the brow' doctrine flouted
basic copyright principles .... But 'sweat of the brow'
courts took a contrary view; they handed out proprietary
interests in facts... But to accord copyright protection
on this basis alone distorts basic copyright principles in
that it creates a monopoly in public domain....' (499
U.S. at 354)
Comment: The Feist case is one of the most important copyright
cases the Supreme Court has decided. The Court's emphasis on
originality as a constitutional condition for copyright shows the
extent to which copyright law protects material in the public
domain from the monopoly of copyright. Thus, the Court said that
there is a constitutional right to use public domain material that
is contained in a copyrighted work.
8. Primary Function of Copyright is to Provide Public Access.
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). In this case,
defendant won an infringement action and applied for attorney's
fees under section 505 of the copyright statute. Although the lower
court granted successful plaintiffs attorneys' fees as a matter of
right, it treated successful defendants differently and required them
to show that the defeated plaintiff's action was frivolous or brought
in bad faith. The Supreme Court rejected this dual standard and
said:
Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of
enriching the general public through access to creative
works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of
copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. To
that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of
meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to
litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are
encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.... [A] successful defense of a copyright infringement action may further the policies of the Copyright
Act every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an
infringement claim by the holder of a copyright. (510
U.S. 527)
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Comment: The Court's ruling is important for defendants in
infringement actions, but it is more important for the law of
copyright because it emphasizes the purpose of copyright as
"enriching the general public through access." Public access is
ultimately the only justification for the grant of the copyright
monopoly.
9. Fair Use Is to Be Determined Individually for Each Work.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Plaintiff music
publisher sued defendant rap group for parodying and recording its
copyrighted song, "Oh, Pretty Woman." Defendant claimed the
parody was a fair use. The Court of Appeals held for plaintiff,
saying that commercial use requires a presumption of unfair use,
because the effect on the potential market is the most important
element of fair use.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a parody may be a fair
use, and explained that the fair use doctrine "calls for case-by-case
analysis .... Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in
isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright." 510 U.S.
at 577-578.
Comment: The Court in this case corrects two common errors of
many lower courts. One error was to treat the fourth statutory
factor (market effect) as being the most important factor; the other
error was to give copyrighted works class treatment by holding, for
example, that since the copying of material from one book is
infringement, copying from all books is infringement. The lower
courts used this proposition as a predicate for granting a permanent injunction enjoining defendant from copying from any book.
The Court took note of this practice and suggested that "the goals
of copyright law ...

are not always best served by automatically

granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone
beyond the bounds of fair use." The Court pointed out that
infringements that are simple piracy are to be distinguished from
those raising reasonable contentions of fair use, and explained that
the copyright holder's interest can be adequately protected by an
award of damages for infringement. 510 U.S. at 578 n.10.
10. Copyright Is to Serve the Public Interest in Preference to
Private Interests. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
This case is used for this proposition because it is the most recent.
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The passage from the case quoted below indicates the extent to
which the Court has used and relied on the proposition that
copyright is to serve the public interest in preference to private
interests.
We have often recognized the monopoly privileges [of
copyright] that Congress has authorized, while 'intended
to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,' are limited in
nature and must ultimately serve the public good. Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984). For example, in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), we
discussed the policies under the 1909 Copyright Act as
follows:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly ...

reflects a balance of competing

claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and
the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's'
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.' (Footnotes omitted.)
We reiterated this theme in Feist Publications,Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), where
we said:
'The primary objective of copyright is not to reward
the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed by a work.' (citations omitted.) (510 U.S. at 526-27)
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Comment: Few copyright scholars would dispute the point that
lower courts have not always ruled in accordance with these rulings
of the Supreme Court. There seem to be two reasons. One is that
courts generally have failed to recognize the distinction between the
copyright and the work. Without this understanding, there is no
basis for distinguishing between the use of the copyright, which
requires resort to fair use criteria, and the use of the work, which
does not.
The second reason is that copyright has not been assigned a
specific task in regard to the public interest other than the
promotion of knowledge and learning. The general goal tends to
succumb to the specific goal of protecting the copyright holder's
private interest. One remedy for this unbalanced view is to
recognize that copyright law protects the public interest in two
specific ways: (1) it protects the public domain; and (2) it insures
access to recorded knowledge and learning. Once these goals are
recognized, it will be easier for courts to maintain a proper balance
between the public interest in protecting the proprietary interest of
copyright holders and the public interest in protecting the right of
access for users.
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